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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court recognizes "government speech" as a defense to First
Amendment challenges brought by private speakers who claim that the
government has impermissibly excluded them from an expressive opportunity
based on their views.1 If a court characterizes the expression at issue as the
government's, that speech is exempt from Free Speech Clause scrutiny, and the
plaintiffs claim will fail. As the Court has observed, political accountability
measures such as voting and lobbying provide the
sole recourse for those
3
unhappy with their government's expressive choices.

*
Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("It is
vital to the health of our polity that the functioning of the ever more complex and powerful
machinery of government not become democracy's dark lagoon.").
** Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I am grateful to Josie Brown,
Dave Duff, Kevin Hall, and the participants in the South Carolina Law Review's Symposium
entitled The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: Its Tradition,Its Jurisprudence,and Its
Future. Special thanks to the South Carolina Law Review staff for its exceptional work in
organizing an outstanding conference.
1. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009).
2.
Id. ("The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does
not regulate government speech."); see also Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553
(2005) ("[T]he dispositive question is whether the generic advertising ... is the Government's own
speech and therefore is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.").
3.
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)
("When the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular
idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy. If the
citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.").
Note too that constitutional constraints other than the Free Speech Clause may also apply to the
government's own expression. See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[E]ven if
the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers are
bound by the Constitution's other proscriptions, including those supplied by the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses.").
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To be sure, government speech is enormously valuable in informing the
public of its government's principles and priorities. 4 The Supreme Court,
however, has been too quick to defer to public entities' assertions that contested
speech is their own; indeed, it has yet to deny the government's claim to speech
in the face of a competing private claim.5 Especially troubling, the majority has
declined to require that the government clearly identify itself as the source of a
contested message as a condition of claiming the government speech defense
despite the great benefits and negligible costs of such a requirement. 6

Although the Court has not yet articulated a clear rule for parsing
government speech from private speech, it has at times highlighted two factors
as key to its characterization of contested speech as government speechwhether the government established the overall message to be communicated
and whether the government approved and controlled the message ultimately
disseminated.7 In the Court's most recent government speech decision, for
example, Justice Alito's majority opinion focused on these "establishment and
control" factors in concluding that a city's decision to accept or reject privately
donated monuments for permanent display in a city park constituted the city's
own speech. 8 The majority did not go so far, however, as to insist on these

4.
See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 698 (1970)
("[Government speech] enables the government to inform, explain, and persuade-measures
especially crucial in a society that attempts to govern itself with a minimum use of force."); Steven
Shiffirin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565, 604 (1980) (describing government speech as
providing the public with "the advantage of knowing the collective judgment of the legislature and
of knowing the views of its representatives, which would in turn be useful for evaluating them").
5.
See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1130-31 (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a city's
selective decisions about which privately donated monuments to accept for permanent display in a
city park on grounds that such decisions reflected the city's own speech); Johanns, 544 U.S. at 56264 (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by dissenting beef producers taxed to find a generic
beef campaign implemented by the Department of Agriculture on grounds that the campaign
reflected the government's own speech); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178-80, 193 (1991)
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to regulations that prohibited federally funded family
planning clinics from providing counseling or referral information about abortion on grounds that
government is free to promote its chosen messages).
6.
Johanns, 544 U.S. at 564 n.7.
7.
See id. at 563-64 ("[T]he beef advertisements are subject to political safeguards more
than adequate to set them apart from private messages. The program is authorized and the basic
message prescribed by federal statute, and specific requirements for the promotions' content are
imposed by federal regulations promulgated after notice and comment. The Secretary of
Agriculture, a politically accountable official, oversees the program, appoints and dismisses the key
personnel, and retains absolute veto power over the advertisements' content, right down to the
wording. And Congress, of course, retains oversight authority, not to mention the ability to reform
the program at any time. No more is required.").
8.
Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1134 ("[T]he City has 'effectively controlled' the messages sent
by the monuments in the Park by exercising 'final approval authority' over their selection. The City
has selected those monuments that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the image of the
City that it wishes to project to all who frequent the Park; it has taken ownership of most of the
monuments in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monument that is the focus of
respondent's concern; and the City has now expressly set forth the criteria it will use in making
future selections." (citations omitted) (quoting Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61)).
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factors as the sole means of distinguishing private speech from governmental
speech. 9

Elsewhere, I have proposed that a public entity seeking to claim the
government speech defense should be required to establish that it "expressly
claim[ed] the speech as its own when it authorize[d]" the communication and
that onlookers understand the speech "to be the government's at the time of its
delivery." 10 Requiring the government to make clear its role as a message's
source demands very little from the government as a practical matter while
providing considerable value in ensuring meaningful political accountability and
preventing the development
of, to use Judge Wilkinson's elegant phrase,
11
"democracy's dark lagoon."
Absent definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts still
struggle with how to characterize certain associations, alliances, and other
entanglements between government and private speakers, thus complicating the
government speech question. 12 These challenges will continue to arise in forms
of expression both old and new, as the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has been among the first to confront them and among the most
thoughtful in so doing.
II. LONGSTANDING CHALLENGES INVOLVING COMPLICATED PARTNERSHIPS
In a context that raises challenging questions about both state and personal
identity, controversy continues over whether state specialty license plate
programs should be considered the government's own speech.13 The South
Carolina legislature, for example, sought to issue a "Choose Life" plate, but not a
plate with a prochoice message, to communicate its views on abortion. Virginia

9. For example, the majority opinion also alluded to the test preferred by a number of the
concurring justices when it noted that observers would likely attribute the expression to the city. See
id. ("The City's actions provided a more dramatic form of adoption than the sort of formal
endorsement that respondent would demand, unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the
City intends the monument to speak on its behalf."); id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Nor is it
likely, given the near certainty that observers will associate permanent displays with the
governmental property owner, that the government will be able to avoid political accountability for
the views that it endorses or expresses through this means."); id. at 1142 (Souter, J., concurring)
("[T]he best approach that occurs to me is to ask whether a reasonable and fully informed observer
would understand the expression to be government speech, as distinct from private speech the
government chooses to oblige by allowing the monument to be placed on public land.").
10. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying Expression's Source, 88
B.U. L. REv. 587, 599 (2008).

11. Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
12. See Norton, supra note 10, at 590-91.
13. See id. at 590.

14. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose (Rose 1), 361 F.3d 786, 787 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J., writing separately). In Rose I, the panel concurred in the judgment only. Id. Judge
Luttig and Judge Gregory concurred in the judgment but wrote separate opinions. Id. at 800 (Luttig,
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 801 (Gregory, J., concurring in the judgment).
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earlier rejected the Sons of Confederate Veterans' request for a specialty plate
depicting a confederate flag because Virginia sought to prevent the mistaken
impression that it endorsed that flag. 15 In both cases, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the plates could not be characterized as the government's own
speech and thus upheld the private plaintiffs' First Amendment claims that the
16
State had impermissibly rejected their proposed messages based on viewpoint.
Unlike the Supreme Court majority, the Fourth Circuit in these cases has
appropriately emphasized meaningful political accountability as key to public
entities' ability to claim the government speech defense. 17 In Planned
Parenthood of South Carolina Inc. v. Rose, Judge Michael observed, "The
government speech doctrine was not intended to authorize cloaked advocacy that
allows the State to promote an idea without being accountable to the political
process." 19 I fully agree: in any government speech dispute, courts should focus
on whether the government's identity as speaker is sufficiently clear to ensure
that the public can hold it accountable for its expressive choices.
Once we identify the appropriate focus-as the Fourth Circuit has-the
inquiry then turns on determining whether onlookers are likely to understand the
contested messages as reflecting the view of the private party, the government,
or both. To be sure, specialty license plates present hard cases. 20 Although the
plates are manufactured, issued, and owned by the State and prominently feature
the State's name, private parties choose to display them on their own property:
their cars. States additionally complicate the inquiry when they invite private
individuals or organizations to provide input into the messages' substantive
content.
In Rose, for example, Judge Michael found that the government's role as
speaker was not sufficiently clear
21 in the specialty license plate context to trigger
the government speech defense. Although he acknowledged the complexity of

15. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles,
288 F.3d 610, 613-16 (4th Cir. 2002).
16. See Rose I, 361 F.3d at 794 (Michael, J.,
writing separately) (concluding that the speech
at issue was a mixture of private speech and government speech); id. at 800 (Luttig, J., concurring
in the judgment) (concluding that the speech at issue was hybrid speech); id. at 801 (Gregory, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (expressing belief that the speech at issue had elements of both private
speech and government speech); Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 621 (concluding that the
speech at issue constituted private speech).
17. See Rose I, 361 F.3d at 795-96 (Michael, J., writing separately); Sons of Confederate
Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618.
18. 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 795-96 (Michael, J., writing separately).
20. For an extensive discussion of the cues that onlookers and courts may use to determine a
message's source, see Norton, supra note 10, at 603-18, which concludes that onlookers rely on a
variety of cues to a message's source, including not only express indications of a message's origin,
but also less direct signals like a message's physical location or onlookers' expectations based on
past practice.
21. See Rose I, 361 F.3d at 794 (Michael, J., writing separately).
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the analysis, 22 Judge Michael ultimately concluded that the State violated the
First Amendment by excluding plates with prochoice countermessages.2 3 In
particular, he emphasized his concern about onlookers' inability to recognize the
plates as the government's own message for which it could thus be held
politically accountable: "[T]he State's advocacy of the pro-life viewpoint may
not be readily apparent to those who see the Choose Life plate ... ,24 He
explained this point in the following way:
Those who see the Choose Life plate displayed on vehicles, and fail to
see a comparable pro-choice plate, are likely to assume that the presence
of one plate and the absence of another are the result of popular
choice.... The State can thereby mislead the public into thinking that it
has already won support for the position it is promoting....
...
[C]ontinuing transparency is essential to accountability. Given
the array of specialty license plates available in South Carolina, a citizen
is less likely to associate the plate messages with the State .... As the
citizen becomes less likely to associate specialty plate messages with the
State, the State's accountability for any message is correspondingly
diminished.2 5
Reasonable people can-and do-reach different conclusions as to whom
onlookers will hold responsible for the plates' messages. In making such
assessments, for example, I tend to agree with Judge Gregory's and Judge
Niemeyer's dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc in Sons of Confederate
Veterans v. Commissioner of the VirginiaDepartmentof Motor Vehicles.26 Judge
Gregory emphasized what he saw as the government's reasonable fear that it
would be misunderstood as endorsing a message with which it did not agree if it
were required to produce and issue a license plate with the Confederate flag logo
next to the identifier Virginia in large letters:
I would have hoped, if rehearing were granted, that we would consider
the government's interest in avoiding "speech by attribution;" that is, the
government's right not to be compelled to speak by private citizens....

22. See id. at 789 (noting that the "Choose Life" message was developed and proposed by
state legislators rather than by private speakers and that the legislature approved the plates in a

special act of authorization, thus signaling the government's role as the message's author in at least
some respect). Judge Shedd emphasized those same facts-the State's role in authorizing the
plates-in identifying the State as the speaker: "If a government cannot be deemed to speak through
such a statute, then I wonder how it can speak at all." Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose (Rose
I/), 373 F.3d 580, 589 (4th Cir. 2004) (Shedd, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Rose 1,361 F.3d at 799 (Michael, J., writing separately).
Id. at 795.
Id.at 798-99.
305 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2002).
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*.. [T]hat there will be a perception of government endorsement of
the Confederate flag is undeniable27....
[T]he display of the Confederate
flag will be attributed to Virginia.
Judge Niemeyer defended Virginia's decision to refuse to issue a state plate
that featured the Confederate flag logo for similar reasons. He noted that "the
State has only indicated that the Confederate Flag logo should not be included on
a license plate issued and owned by the state and bearing the name 'VIRGINIA'
on the top."' 28 He argued:
I respectfully submit that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion
that the Commonwealth of Virginia, by manufacturing license plates,
placing its name at the top of those plates, and retaining ownership of
them, is the speaker of any message contained on those plates, even
though the message may have been29adopted by the State pursuant to an
application submitted by a licensee.
Such competing assessments led Judge Luttig thoughtfully to resist the
invitation to characterize such expression as entirely governmental or entirely
private, noting instead the possibility of "hybrid" speech. 30 He declined,
however, to grant the government the power to control the viewpoint of such
31
speech.
Elsewhere, I have offered my view that the better approach would
understand specialty license plates not as primarily private speech or even as
hybrid speech, but as "joint speech" between the government and those private
parties who choose to display those plates.32 In other words, sometimes speech
may most accurately be described as simultaneously reflecting the views of
governmental speakers and private speakers, both of whom have chosen to share
a message. 33 This is especially the case when a public actor offers private
speakers a voluntary opportunity to join the government's own speech-an
opportunity that may be especially attractive because it appears to carry some
indication of government endorsement or imprimatur. 34 This concept of joint

27. Id. at 252 (Gregory, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
28. Id. at 249 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
29. Id. at 251.
30. See id. at 245 (Luttig, J., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (noting the
possibility of hybrid governmental and private speech).
31. See id. at 247 (concluding that the State may not engage in viewpoint discrimination
where the private component of such hybrid speech is substantial and "the government's interest in
its speech component is less than compelling").
32. See Norton, supra note 10, at 618-22.
33. Id. at 620-21.
34. See Higgins v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 13 P.3d 531, 541 n.4 (Or. Ct.
App. 2000) (en banc) (Wollheim, J., concurring) ("[T]he license plate bears the imprimatur of the
state. Petitioner wants the state's endorsement of his message ....
[A] bumper sticker would not
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speech "values both speakers' interests in expressive integrity" by understanding
such speech to require both parties' endorsement, "thus permitting the
government
to control the content of its own expression but not to compel others
35
to join it."
36
Recall, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in Wooley v. Maynard,
which held that the government could not require an objecting private speaker to
display the state's motto on his car's license plate. 37 In Rose, Judge Michael
cited Wooley for the proposition that license plate messages "are associated at
least partly with the vehicle owners." 3 8 But Wooley also supports the additional
proposition that the government retains the power to control the character of its
39
own expression and to permit-but not to force-others to join that expression.
Indeed, the Wooley Court "raised no quarrel with New Hampshire's
communicative choice to feature its motto 'Live Free or Die' on the State's
license plates,"' 4 ° and it did not permit the dissenting
private speaker to force the
41
government to change its message to his liking.
Along these lines, for example, the government may decide that it will print
and sell "Drill, Baby, Drill" license plates--or bumper stickers or screen
savers-but that it will not print and sell license plates featuring the message
"Go Green." That expressive choice offers voters important information that
furthers their ability to evaluate their government (even if-and perhaps
especially if-the public finds the government's expression objectionable). The
government speech defense should thus be understood to prevent a private
speaker from forcing the government to display messages with which the
government disagrees on its license plates (or bumper stickers or screen
savers).43 Those who agree with the government's view may choose to buy and
display those messages, but the First Amendment does not permit the
government to compel anyone to do so, and it may not prevent anyone44from
producing bumper stickers or screen savers with their own countermessage
In other words, so long as the government's identity as speaker is clear,
recognizing the possibility of joint speech acknowledges the strength of the

satisfy petitioner's desire to have the state endorse the words he chooses to display."), aff'd, 72 P.3d
628 (Or. 2003).
35. Norton, supra note 10, at 620-21.
36. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
37. Id. at 713.
38. Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (Michael, J., writing
separately) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717; Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm'r of the
Va. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (4th Cir. 2002)).
39. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
40. Norton, supra note 10, at 621 (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717).
41. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at717.
42. See Helen Norton, ConstrainingPublic Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its
Workers' Speech to ProtectIts Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 21 (2009).
43. Norton, supra note 10, at 621.

44. Id.
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government's expressive interests without relieving it of accountability for that
speech. This requires the government up front to design and claim the expression
transparently as its own. Again, so long as the government's identity as speaker
is clear both at the time of the message's creation as well as at the time of its
delivery, private parties' voluntary participation in developing or delivering that
message need not strip that speech of its governmental character.
By
identifying two points at which the government must expose its expressive
choices, such a requirement also helps answer the "legitimate concern that the
government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain
private speakers over others based on viewpoint."4 7 Of course, the government
also remains free to create a specialty license plate program from which it
disclaims any speech interest of its own and instead creates some sort of forum
for private expression, in which case traditional Free Speech Clause principles
48
apply, including the ban on viewpoint discrimination against private speakers.
Despite my disagreement with Judge Michael's conclusions as to whether
onlookers are likely to attribute specialty license plate messages to the State in
these concededly tough cases,4 9 I commend his attention to meaningful political
accountability and his refusal simply to defer to the government's claims to
speech as its own. The Fourth Circuit's opinions in this area, moreover, have
been very influential, further demonstrating their forcefulness. Although the
circuits remain split on whether to characterize specialty plates as private speech
or government51 speech,50 the split is heavily weighted towards the Fourth
Circuit's view.

45. See id.at 625.
46. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005) (concluding that a
Department of Agriculture promotional campaign remained government speech even though private
parties participated in the campaign's development).
47. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1134 (2009).
48. Norton, supra note 10, at 619.
49. See Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 798-99 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Michael, J.,
writing separately).
50. Norton, supra note 10, at 590.
51. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, for example, have relied heavily on the Fourth
Circuit's analysis in Rose in refusing to characterize "Choose Life" plates as government speech.
See Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009); Choose Life Ill., Inc. v. White, 547 F.3d
853, 863 (7th Cir. 2008); Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008). The
Sixth Circuit, in contrast, "concluded that Tennessee's issuance of a 'Choose Life' license plate
reflected the legislature's own pro-life views and thus constituted government speech within the
state's power to control." Norton, supra note 10, at 590 (citing ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441
F.3d 370, 375-77 (6th Cir. 2006)). The Supreme Court has so far declined numerous petitions for
certiorari on this issue. See White, 547 F.3d 853, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 59 (2009); Stanton, 515
F.3d 956, cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 56 (2008); Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, cert. denied, 548 U.S. 906
(2006); Rose, 361 F.3d 786, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1119 (2005).
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III. EMERGING CHALLENGES INVOLVING NEWER EXPRESSIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Most government speech disputes to date have involved fairly traditional
forms of expression. 52 Emerging technologies, however, have transformed the
ways in which the government-along with the rest of us-actually
communicates. Although the Supreme Court has yet to grapple with the
constitutional significance of the government's increasing use of Web 2.0 and
other newer expressive technologies, 53 the Fourth Circuit has again been among
the leaders in addressing these challenges.
More specifically, in Page v. Lexington County School District One,54 the
Fourth Circuit considered a dispute over whether a public school board's use of
Web sites, emails, and hyperlinks to other Web sites constitutes the
government's own speech that it may control exempt from Free Speech Clause
scrutiny.55 After passing a resolution announcing its opposition to pending
school voucher legislation, the school board in that case authorized public
communication of its views on the district's Web site, as well as in emails and
56
letters to parents and school employees. A supporter of the voucher legislation,
Randall Page, then requested that he be allowed to post his provoucher materials
on the district's Web site. 57 When the district declined, he filed suit, arguing that
the denial constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment.58 Among other things, Mr. Page objected to the fact that the
district's Web site linked to Web sites of other organizations that shared the
district's opposition to the voucher legislation. 59 He argued that the district had
thus opened up its Web site as a type of speech "forum from which he could not
be excluded based on his viewpoint."
The Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Page's claim.61 It agreed with the school
district that the government speech doctrine permits the school to communicate
its own viewpoint via Web site and email without any obligation to allow others
to join or distort that expression:

52. See, e.g., Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1131 (physical monuments displayed in public park);
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420-22 (2006) (written memoranda); Johanns v. Livestock
Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553-55 (2005) (television and print advertising); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 178-80 (1991) (verbal family planning counseling).
53. For more extensive discussion of these changes and what they might mean for the
government speech doctrine, see Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0,
87 DENV. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
54. 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 277-78. I served pro bono as counsel of record to amici in support of the defendantrespondent school board in this case on appeal. See Brief for National School Boards Association et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Page, 531 F.3d 275 (No. 07-1697).
56. Page, 531 F.3d at 278-79.
57. Id. at 279.
58. Id. at 279-80.
59. Id. at 283.

60. Id.
61.

Id. at 285.
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This case reduces to the straightforward circumstance where the
Lexington School District determined to oppose the pending Put Parents
in Charge Act and charged its School/Community Relations Director to
communicate that message to virtually anyone who would hear it. The
School/Community Relations Director employed the School District's
website, e-mail facility, and other distribution methods to communicate
the message to constituent schools, students, and the public. Throughout
its campaign, the School District maintained control over the
development and dissemination of its message, and it never allowed
private persons to participate in the channels through which it
disseminated its message so as to create a public forum. We agree with
the district court that the School District engaged in government speech
and that its speech did not implicate the First Amendment or Page's
First Amendment rights. 62
This case powerfully illustrates government expression's value to the public.
A politically accountable public education body-the elected school boardpublicly took a position on proposed public education policy and communicated
that position on a Web site that clearly identified its governmental origins. 63 Not
only may voters find those views helpful in informing their own opinions, they
now know where their elected officials stand and can try to elect new board
members if they disagree with that position. 64
After recognizing the value of government speech to the public, the next step
is to empower the government to deliver that speech to the public in an effective
manner. The constitutional analysis should not vary with the type of expressive
technology at issue. Today, of course, effective communication often requires
the use of Web sites along with links to other materials that further support the
speaker's message. So long as the governmental source of the message is
apparent-in other words, so long as the government speaker makes clear that it
is linking to other speakers' Web sites to bolster its explanation of its own
position-the government's inclusion of those links in support of its own views
should not strip those views of their governmental character.
The facts in Page made for a relatively easy decision because the design and
context of the government's Web site made clear the government's identity as
source of that particular viewpoint. 65 As the Fourth Circuit panel recognized, this
situation is very different from situations where a school board or other
government body creates a chat room or other forum for the ventilation of
individual views on pending legislation or any other topic; in those contexts,

62. Id. at 288.
63. See id. at 282.
64. Cf id. at 287 ("It is therefore appropriate for the School District to defend public
education in the face of pending legislation that it views as potentially threatening of public
education.").
65. See id. at 278.
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First Amendment principles would not permit the government to exclude
66
speakers on the basis of their viewpoint. Nor, of course, could the government
prevent Mr. Page from starting his own Web site promoting his views or sending
his own emails or letters.
Finally, Mr. Page additionally argued for limits on the government's ability
to speak on certain matters or to target its speech to certain audiences, objecting
to the school board's speech on pending legislation directed to potential voters.
The Fourth Circuit again remained appropriately focused on political
accountability as the touchstone of, and the sole remedy for those unhappy with,
government speech:
[Mr. Page's] argument is grounded on the proposition that when the
School District attempts to influence legislation, its position is not
checked by the "ballot box," which is the traditional justification for
accepting the government speech doctrine....
In this case, Page assumes erroneously that the ballot box is not
available to check the government speech. He overlooks that "[school]
board members are elected. They may be removed, at the next election,
if the voters disagree with the manner in which they have exercised their
discretion. No more immediate 'ballot box' remedy is suggested by the
case law," as the district court appropriately noted.
Many courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to
government speech involving advocacy regarding ballot measures.
While the issue in this case is not a ballot measure before individual
voters, but rather a bill before the state legislature, grass-roots lobbying
of the type witnessed here nonetheless presents no greater concerns
from a democratic accountability standpoint than advocacy regarding
measures on the ballot. The ultimate target for the School District's
campaign against the Put Parents in Charge Act was the State's General
Assembly, and members of the General Assembly-the ones who will
ultimately vote on the measure-are themselves public officials
and
68
interest.
public
the
decide
to
responsibility
independent
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Again, the Fourth Circuit has proven influential in this area, as the First
Circuit recently relied heavily on Page to reach a similar result in a case
challenging a government's rejection of the plaintiffs request that
the
69
government's Web site include a hyperlink to a Web site of the plaintiff.

66. See id. at 284-85.
67. Id. at 287.
68. Id. at 287-88 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
69. Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 318-19, 335 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting, on
government speech grounds, the plaintiffs First Amendment challenge to the town's refusal to
include a hyperlink to his Web site on its own Web site).
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Finally, note that the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
government's ability to claim the speech of its employees as its own in Garcetti
v. Ceballos. There, the Court considered a First Amendment challenge by a
prosecutor who had been disciplined for his internal memo that criticized a
police affidavit as deliberately inaccurate.71 Characterizing a government
employer as free to exercise "employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created,, 72 the majority held that public employees' speech
made "pursuant to their official duties" receives no First Amendment protection
from employer discipline. 73 The majority thus "created a bright-line rule that
treats public employees' speech delivered pursuant to their official duties as the
government's
own speech" that it "may control free from First Amendment
74
scrutiny.,
As I have discussed elsewhere, Garcetti has been by far the most
consequential of the Court's government speech decisions in real world terms.75
Although governments "frequently hire workers specifically to monitor and flag
dangerous or illegal conditions, Garcetti now ... empowers the government to
punish them for doing just that., 7 6 Lower courts thus "routinely apply Garcettito
dispose of the constitutional claims" of police officers and a wide variety of
other public employees who were fired because they performed their jobs in
flagging unlawful, unsafe, or otherwise improper conduct.77
Those seeking to limit Garcetti's reach-and its often disturbing
consequences-must now distinguish it by taking a hard look at whether a public
employee's contested speech actually occurred pursuant to her official job
78
duties. The Fourth Circuit demonstrated thoughtful leadership in this area in
Andrew v. Clark.7 9 That case involved a First Amendment challenge by police
officer Michael Andrew, who had been disciplined after writing (and later
sharing with a reporter) a memo that recommended an investigation into the
department's use of deadly force against a barricaded suspect where "there were
no hostages and no evidence that the suspect intended to commit further violence
from within his apartment., 80 Citing Garcetti, the district court dismissed the

70.
71.
72.

547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 413-15.
Id. at 422.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 421.
Norton, supra note 42, at 12.
See id. at 11-16.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14-15.
See id. at 13.
561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 264-65.
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officer's case. 8 1 However, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's order of
82
dismissal, identifying a question of fact as to whether the officer's official
duties actually required83him to write a memo on this particular event, much less
share it with the media.
Judge Wilkinson's concurrence eloquently identified the high stakes in the
case, observing that a contrary result "would have profound adverse effects on
accountability in government."84 Among other things, he wondered whether the
expressive changes brought by the Internet would contribute to the loss of
government watchdog efforts long undertaken by traditional news organizations,
expressing concern that "intense scrutiny of the inner workings of massive
public bureaucracies charged with major public responsibilities is in deep
trouble."85
[T]he First Amendment should never countenance the gamble that
informed scrutiny of the workings of government will be left to wither
on the vine. That scrutiny is impossible without some assistance from
inside sources such as Michael Andrew. Indeed, it may be more
important than ever that such sources carry the story to the reporter,
because there are, sad to say, fewer shoeleather journalists to ferret the
story out.
•.. This case may seem a small one, involving a single incident in a
single locality, but smaller cases are often not without larger
implications. The court is right to note that at this early stage, we cannot
foresee who will prevail. But as the state grows more layered and
impacts lives more profoundly, it seems inimical to First Amendment
principles to treat too summarily those who bring, often at some
personal risk, its operations into public view. It is vital to the health of
our polity that the functioning of the ever more complex and powerful
86
machinery of government not become democracy's dark lagoon.
Even though reasonable people might disagree on the answers, the Fourth
Circuit has been asking exactly the right questions, thus shining a light on
democracy's (sometimes dark) waters. In sum, it has recognized the great value
of government speech to the public while remaining mindful that such value
turns on the public's ability to ascertain the speech's governmental source and
has thus insisted that the government remain meaningfully accountable to the
public for its speech as a condition of claiming the government speech defense.
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Andrew v. Clark, 472 F. Supp. 2d 659, 660 (D. Md. 2007) (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos,
410 (2006)), aff'd inpart,vacated inpart,561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009).
Andrew, 561 F.3d at 263.
See id. at 267.
Id. at 272 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
Id. at 272-73.
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